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Australia · NSW Independent Casino Commission (NICC) · Independent Liquor & Gaming Authority (ILGA)VERIFIED

Star Entertainment — Bell Inquiry findings, NSW casino licence suspended, AUD 100M penalty

The Star Pty Ltd; Star Entertainment Group

Incident type
AML · Junket fraud · Regulatory sanction
Conduct period
CUP process 2013–2020; Suncity dealings 2017–2020; primary review window 29 November 2016 – 13 September 2021
First-instance verdict
2022-08-31
Final adjudication
2022-10-17
Status
Final
Last verified
2026-05-02

Summary

Adam Bell SC's 2022 inquiry into The Star Pty Ltd, operator of The Star Sydney casino, found the company unsuitable to hold a casino licence in New South Wales. The three-volume report documented systemic failures including a deceptive China Union Pay (CUP) card process that disguised gambling transactions as hotel expenses, facilitating circumvention of Chinese capital controls; permitting Suncity junket operations with cash-for-chip exchanges in a private gaming room; misleading banking partner NAB and regulator ILGA; and inadequate anti-money laundering controls, responsible gambling protocols, and governance. The NSW Independent Casino Commission responded on 17 October 2022 by suspending the licence indefinitely effective 21 October 2022, fining the operator AUD 100 million, and appointing an independent manager. A second Bell inquiry in August 2024 found the operator still unsuitable.

Timeline

VERIFIED
  1. ILGA appoints Adam Bell SC to conduct an inquiry under sections 143 and 143A of the Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW).

  2. Bell delivers three-volume report finding The Star and Star Entertainment unsuitable to hold or be associated with a NSW casino licence.

  3. NICC suspends The Star's NSW casino licence indefinitely effective 21 October 2022; imposes AUD 100 million pecuniary penalty; appoints Nicholas Weeks as Special Manager for 90 days.

  4. Weeks's appointment as Special Manager extended until 19 January 2024.

  5. NICC appoints Adam Bell SC to conduct a second inquiry into whether The Star had achieved suitability.

  6. Second Bell Report finds The Star remains unsuitable; cites six unimplemented recommendations, dysfunctional leadership, and a 'new cultural shadow value' of antagonism toward the NICC.

  7. NICC issues show-cause notice to The Star regarding licence cancellation and a further AUD 100 million fine.

The operation

VERIFIED
  • From July 2013 to March 2020, The Star operated a CUP card process at its hotel disguising gambling transactions as accommodation expenses; 1,307 patrons conducted 8,912 transactions totalling AUD 908 million.
  • The Star created a 'temporary cheque cashing facility' to circumvent statutory credit prohibitions while awaiting fund clearance; executives knew overseas banks would not honour the counter-cheques.
  • The largest CUP user, Phillip Lee, withdrew over AUD 100 million; in April 2015 he swiped over AUD 22 million in three days without meaningful restrictions or source-of-wealth checks.
  • Suncity junket operated 'Salon 95' at The Star from 2017; CCTV captured cash-for-chip exchanges at a service desk, with internal emails noting Suncity was 'operating a business model under our noses which is problematic … with respect to AML/CTF laws.'
  • In 2019, Star Entertainment provided 'brazenly and deliberately misleading' responses to NAB regarding UnionPay queries about the true nature of CUP transactions; the Chief Legal and Risk Officer and CFO contributed to the wording.
  • The Star's board was not informed of CUP risks during operation; a 2021 'Project Zurich' board paper provided a sanitised account.
  • Governance failure: the Board of The Star (the licence-holding entity) was composed entirely of Star Entertainment executives who only met for statutory purposes, with all key decisions made at the parent company level.

Primary sources

  1. Review of The Star Pty Ltd, Report of the Inquiry under section 143 of the Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW), Volume 1Adam Bell SC for ILGA, 2022-08-31 [link]
  2. The Bell Review of The Star (regulator page)NSW Independent Casino Commission [link]
  3. Report finds Sydney's The Star 'not suitable' to run a casinoABC News, 2022-09-12 [link]
  4. Outcome of the 2024 Independent Inquiry into The Star (legal update summary)Addisons, 2024-08-30 [link]
  5. NSW casino regulator issues The Star Sydney with show cause noticeABC News, 2024-09-12 [link]

Analysis — surveillance & operations perspective

ANALYSIS

Editorial commentary by Surveillance Intelligence Asia. Opinion — clearly distinguished from the verified facts above.

The Bell Report is the most comprehensive forensic reconstruction of an Asia-Pacific concessionaire-equivalent operator on the public record. Three patterns matter beyond the AUD 100M penalty.

First, the China Union Pay process was not a single bypass — it was a productised service. AUD 908 million across 8,912 transactions over seven years, with 1,307 patrons, plus a 'temporary cheque cashing facility' deliberately designed to circumvent statutory credit prohibitions. This is product-managed regulatory evasion, not opportunistic violation. The fact that it had a name, a process, and a customer base is what made it a finding of unsuitability rather than a finding of breach.

Second, the Salon 95 / Suncity arrangement at The Star paralleled the Macau model: a junket-controlled VIP room operating on concessionaire premises with cash-for-chip exchanges visible on CCTV, and internal emails acknowledging the AML risk. The internal-email-as-Bell-Report-evidence pattern is now a defining feature of the modern casino prosecution. Operators who allow problem-acknowledgement emails to sit unactioned create the prosecution case against themselves.

Third, Star's board-level governance failure — operator board composed entirely of parent-company executives, meeting only for statutory purposes — is now a defining example of what regulators consider unsuitable. Board independence is not a corporate-governance nicety in this industry; it is a licence-condition prerequisite. The 2024 second Bell Report finding that The Star remained unsuitable confirmed the regulator views governance reform as the precondition for licence restoration, not the consequence.

Lessons (observation, not prescription)

  • Productised regulatory evasion is the structural failure, not the individual transaction.
  • Internal emails acknowledging compliance risks are evidence that doesn't expire.
  • Operator board independence is a licensing requirement, not optional governance.

Last verified: 2026-05-02. Errors? Email corrections@surveillanceasia.com. Corrections published within 72 hours per editorial process.